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MAINTAINING THE HOME FIELD ADVANTAGE:
ROSE VS. FEDERAL COURT
I. INTRODUCTION
In the case of Peter A. Rose v. A. Bartlett Giamatti,I America
watched one of baseball's foremost personalities, Pete Rose, fight to stave
off a predetermined career death sentence issued by the Commissioner of
Baseball, A. Bartlett Giamatti. The Commissioner accused Rose of wa-
gering on professional baseball in direct violation of Major League
Rules.2 Rose filed the above action in the Court of Common Pleas of
Hamilton County, Ohio.3 He counted on a "home-field advantage" to
vindicate himself of the gambling charges and to restore his reputation as
one of baseball's foremost legends. The District Court of Ohio took
Rose's home-field away and placed him in the cold halls of federal court.
This casenote will show that the district court erroneously exceeded the
scope of inquiry authorized by law for determining its jurisdiction and in
so doing, misinterpreted the power of the Baseball Commissioner.
II. FACTS
In February 1989, the Commissioner of Baseball, A. Bartlett Gia-
matti initiated an investigation regarding allegations that Pete Rose
("Rose") wagered on major league baseball games.4 Giamatti scheduled
a hearing concerning the allegations for June 26, 1989.' In an attempt to
remain a part of the sport to which he has given his life - professional
baseball - Rose initiated an action in the Ohio State Court of Common
Pleas. Rose sought to enjoin the Commissioner's efforts to ban him from
professional baseball through proceedings which Rose alleged violated
baseball's governing agreements and his contract with his employer, the
Cincinnati Reds ("Reds"). Rose's complaint alleged seven causes of ac-
tion based upon state law claims of breach of contract, breach of an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty,
promissory estoppel, tortious interference with contract, negligence and
the common law right of "due process and natural justice."' 6 The crux of
1. 721 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
2. Id. at 909.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. id.
6. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 909 n.1.
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Rose's complaint was two-fold. Rose alleged that Commissioner Gia-
matti, acting as the representative of Major League Baseball, displayed
bias and prejudgment in his investigation and prosecution of Rose re-
garding his alleged gambling activities. Consequently, Rose alleged that
procedural rights guaranteed to him under the Rules of Procedure7 and
his contract with the Reds would be denied. Rose further claimed that
Commissioner Giamatti not only had a duty to abide by the Rules of
Procedure, but Major League Baseball and the Reds also had a duty to
see that he did.'
Common Pleas Court Judge Nadel issued a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") on June 25, 1989, which enjoined all named defendants:
(1) from any involvement in deciding whether Rose should be disci-
plined or suspended from participation in baseball, and (2) from termi-
nating Rose's employment as Field Manager of the Reds, or interfering
with his employment in response to any action taken by Giamatti. 9 De-
fendant Giamatti appealed the TRO to the Ohio Court of Appeals, but
was unsuccessful."° On July 3, 1989 Giamatti filed a notice to remove
the action from the Ohio Court of Common Pleas to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. " Two days later, plain-
tiff Rose filed a motion to remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas
of Ohio.12 Rose argued that the district court lacked diversity subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. District Court Judge Holschuh
granted defendant Giamatti's petition for removal on July 31, 1989. 13
The court decided that for the purposes of determining whether the case
was removable, the citizenship of both Major League Baseball, an unin-
corporated association, and the Reds, a limited partnership, could be ig-
nored." Consequently, diversity jurisdiction existed between the only
remaining parties, Commissioner Giamatti, a citizen of New York, and
Pete Rose, a citizen of Ohio.' 5
7. Plaintiff's Complaint at 23-25, Peter A. Rose v. A. Bartlett Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906
(S.D. Ohio 1989) (No. C-2-89-0577). See also infra note 54.
8. Id.
9. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 909.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 909-10.
13. Id. at 923-24.
14. Rose's petition for an interlocutory appeal was denied on August 17, 1989. The court
stated, "[b]ecause we find the law to be well settled, we... conclude that we are not presented
with a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for a difference of
opinion." Rose, No. 89-8328, slip op. at 3. (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 1989) (emphasis in original).
15. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 923.
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III. BACKGROUND ON DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
The United States district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to only two types of
cases: cases arising under federal law16 or controversies between citizens
of different states, where the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.7
The latter type of jurisdiction is commonly known as diversity jurisdic-
tion. The federal statute permitting removal of cases filed in state court
restricts the types of cases which may be removed from state court to
federal court. To remove a case from state court, it must fall within the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts. " The removal statute provides
that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for
the district and division ... where such action is pending." 9 The statute
also provides that except for a civil action founded on a claim arising
under federal law, "[a]ny other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is
a citizen of the State in which such action is brought."2 °
The reason for granting diversity jurisdiction to federal courts is
that however true the fact may be that state courts will administer justice
as impartially as federal courts, the framers of the Constitution were
skeptical of the state courts' impartiality, and thus established national
tribunals for the decision of controversies between citizens of different
states.2" Thus, the principal advantage to removing a case from state to
federal court is that it ensures the non-resident defendant an unbiased
forum. The diversity statute has historically been interpreted to require
complete diversity of citizenship.22 This means that "diversity jurisdic-
tion does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different state
from each plaintiff."23
In light of these settled principles of law, a case is properly remova-
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1989).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1989).
18. Federal courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases: cases arising under
federal law or controversies between citizens of different states, where the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $50,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1989).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1989).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1989).
21. The origin and purpose of diversity jurisdiction was stated many years ago by Chief
Justice Marshall in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
22. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
23. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
1990)
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ble from state court only if diversity of citizenship exists among all the
parties to the action and none of the defendants in interest properly
joined and served is a citizen of the state where the action is presently
pending.24 In most cases, removability may be determined from the orig-
inal pleadings, and normally an allegation of a cause of action against the
resident defendant will be sufficient to prevent removal. However, when
a defendant alleges that there has been fraudulent joinder,25 the court
"may pierce the pleadings, consider the entire record, and determine the
basis of joinder by any means available."26
Defendant Giamatti contended that Rose's suit was removable be-
cause diversity jurisdiction existed. Giamatti desperately wanted to re-
move the action from the Ohio Court of Common Pleas for numerous
reasons. First, in the Cincinnati state court Rose was a local hero and
Commissioner Giamatti was viewed suspiciously as a foreigner from
New York, accused of bias by Rose.27 A national tribunal would ensure
a hearing free from local prejudice. Second, the federal courts have his-
torically been more favorable to the Commissioner of Major League
Baseball.28
On the face of Rose's complaint, diversity jurisdiction did not exist
to allow removal of the action. However, by alleging fraudulent joinder
in the notice of removal, Giamatti enabled the court to go beyond the
face of the complaint and determine diversity of citizenship based on all
the pleadings.29 If the court concluded that any of the non-diverse de-
fendants were fraudulently joined, then their citizenship could be ignored
and Giamatti's wish for a federal forum would be granted.
IV. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The issue before the court was whether the citizenship of either Ma-
jor League Baseball or the Cincinnati Reds could be disregarded for the
purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction.30 The court held that the
citizenship of these two defendants could be ignored because they were
24. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 910.
25. See infra note 31-32 and accompanying text discussing fraudulent joinder.
26. Dodd v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 82, 85 (10th Cir. 1964).
27. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 910 n.2.
28. See generally Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F.
Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
29. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 910. Defendant Giamatti alleged that both Major League Base-
ball and the Reds were fraudulently joined as defendants for the purpose of attempting to
defeat the district court's removal jurisdiction. Id. at 911.
30. Id. at 911.
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merely nominal parties in the instant action. 31 In reaching that conclu-
sion, the court applied two established doctrines to determine the proper
parties to the suit.
The court looked first to the doctrine of fraudulent joinder. That
doctrine prevents a plaintiff from defeating a defendant's right of removal
by joining a non-diverse defendant against whom the plaintiff has no real
cause of action.32 The court further explained that fraudulent joinder
exists when the plaintiff has no factual basis upon which he can claim
that the resident defendant is liable. Further, the court noted that before
the citizenship of a named defendant will be disregarded for diversity
purposes, the removing party has the burden of proof to establish that
the named defendant was fraudulently joined. The removing party must
establish that "there is no possibility that the plaintiff can establish a
valid cause of action under state law against the non-diverse defendant,
or that there has been outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleadings of juris-
dictional facts.",
3 3
The district court then looked to the nominal parties doctrine to
determine whether diversity jurisdiction existed. That doctrine states
that a federal court must disregard nominal parties to the action, and
determine jurisdiction based only upon the citizenship of real parties to
the controversy. 34 The court defined a real party in interest defendant as
one who, by the substantive law, has the duty sought to be enforced or
enjoined.35
The court then turned to the case at bar and applied the above doc-
trines to each defendant. As the court focused on each defendant, it de-
termined whether their citizenship could be disregarded for the purposes
of establishing diversity jurisdiction.
A. Commissioner Giamatti
The court began its analysis by focusing on a specific portion of
Rose's complaint. Rose alleged that the Commissioner's service as an
investigator, prosecutor and prospective judge denied Rose the right to a
fair hearing before an impartial decision-maker. 36 Rose further alleged
that he was guaranteed this right under the Rules of Procedure and his
31. Id. at 923.
32. Id. at 913.
33. Id. at 914 (citing B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. Unit A
1981)).
34. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 914 (citing Navarro Savings Ass'n. v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980)).
35. Id. (citing Sun Oil Co. of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Labor & Indus., 365
F. Supp. 1403, 1406 (E.D. Pa. 1973)).
36. Id. at 915.
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contract with the Cincinnati Reds.3 7 Focusing upon this portion of the
complaint only, the court concluded that the actual controversy was be-
tween Rose and Commissioner Giamatti.38 The only critical question
left, in Judge Holschuh's mind, was whether in the controversy between
Rose and Giamatti, there was the necessary collision of interests39 be-
tween Rose on the one hand and the Cincinnati Reds and Major League
Baseball on the other hand.'
B. The Major League Baseball Association
The district court began its diversity jurisdiction analysis with re-
gard to defendant Major League Baseball by describing Major League
Baseball as a "unique organization" not a "typical unincorporated asso-
ciation."' The court relied on Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 42 ("Fin-
ley") to set forth a brief synopsis of the events which gave rise to the
formation of the Major League Baseball Association and the powers
vested in the Commissioner through the Major League Agreement.43
The Major League Agreement authorizes the Commissioner to in-
vestigate any act not in the best interests of baseball, to determine what
37. Id. at 915-16.
38. Id. at 917.
39. The necessary collision of interests means that there is a real collision of issues or that
an actual controversy exists between plaintiff and each defendant. 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts
§ 59 (1973).
40. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 915.
41. Id. at 917.
42. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
43. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 917 (citing Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 532
(7th Cir. 1978)). Prior to 1921, professional baseball was governed by a three-man National
Commission which consisted of the presidents of the National and American Leagues and a
third member, usually one of the club owners, selected by the presidents of the two leagues.
Between 1915 and 1921, a series of events and controversies contributed to a growing dissatis-
faction with the National Commission on the part of players, owners and the public. Most
prominent of these events was the "Black Sox Scandal," in which several Chicago White Sox
players had allegedly attempted to "fix" the 1919 World Series. This event rocked the game of
professional baseball and proved the catalyst that brought about the establishment of a single,
neutral Commissioner of Baseball.
In November, 1920, the major league club owners elected federal Judge Landis as the first
Commissioner of Baseball and appointed a committee of owners to draft a charter setting forth
the Commissioner's authority. During one of the drafting sessions an attempt was made to
place limitations on the Commissioner's authority. Judge Landis responded by refusing to
accept the office of Commissioner unless there was a clear understanding that he alone would
have control over whatever and whoever had to do with baseball. Thereupon the owners voted
unanimously to reject the proposed limitation upon the Commissioner's authority, and they all
signed the "Major League Agreement" on January 12, 1921. Courts have construed the agree-
ment as a contract between the constituent clubs of the National and American Leagues, and
is the basic charter under which Major League Baseball operates. Id. at 917-18.
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preventive or punitive action is appropriate, and to take such action
against the leagues, the clubs or individuals.' The Major Leagues45 and
their constituent clubs severally agreed to be bound by the decisions of
the Commissioner and by the discipline imposed by him.46 They further
agreed to "waive such right of recourse to the courts as would otherwise
have existed in their favor."4 7
Relying on the Finley decision and the history of the Major League
Agreement, the court concluded that the Major League Baseball Associ-
ation could not be compared to or equated with a typical unincorporated
association engaged in any other business or even to any other sport.48
In no other business or sport is there quite the same system created for
quite the same reasons and with quite the same underlying policies.49
In emphasizing the extraordinary powers vested in the Commis-
sioner, the court found that the major leagues and the twenty-six clubs
have absolutely no control over the investigative and disciplinary actions
the Commissioner may take pursuant to the Major League Agreement.50
Judge Holschuh noted that Rose did not purport to challenge the Com-
missioner's authority to promulgate rules pursuant to his investigative
and disciplinary authority.51 Rather, Rose challenged Commissioner
Giamatti's conduct of the investigation and disciplinary proceedings in
his particular case.52 From this characterization of Rose's complaint, the
court concluded that Rose's controversy was not with Major League
Baseball, but with the Commissioner of Baseball. 3 Based on the court's
characterization of the primary relief sought by Rose - preventing the
Commissioner from conducting a disciplinary hearing - the court deter-
mined that complete relief could be afforded without the need for any
44. Id. at 918 (quoting Major League Agreement, Art. I. § 2(a) and (b) (originally entered
into January, 1975 and remaining in force until January, 1990).
45. The Major Leagues consist of two separate professional baseball leagues - The Amer-
ican and National Leagues.
46. Major League Agreement, Art. VII § 2 (1975).
47. See Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding
Waiver of recourse clause unless: (1) where the rules, regulations or judgments of the associa-
tion are in contravention to the laws of the land; and (2) where the association has failed to
follow the basic rudiments of due process of law).
48. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 918.
49. Id. This system contains standards such as the best interests of baseball, the interests
of the morale of the players and the honor of the game. It also contains the policy of sports-
manship which accepts the umpire's decision without complaint.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 918.
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judgment against Major League Baseball or its constituent clubs.54
Therefore, Major League Baseball's citizenship could be ignored for the
purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.
C The Cincinnati Reds
In determining whether any real controversy existed between Rose
and the Reds, the court interpreted Rose's employment contract with the
Reds. Rose asserted that the Commissioner's Rules of Procedure55 con-
cerning fair disciplinary hearings were incorporated in his employment
contract with the Reds, and that any action by Commissioner Giamatti
in violation of his own Rules of Procedure would constitute a breach of
Rose's contract with the Reds. 6 Rose's claim against the Reds was for
anticipatory breach. Rose's position was that the Reds owed him a con-
tractual duty to see that the procedural rules were not violated. Thus, if
the Commissioner violated the rules by holding a hearing "without due
regard for natural justice and fair play"57(in violation of the Rules of
Procedure) and as a result, sanctioned Rose, the Reds would be in breach
of contract if they failed to ensure that the hearing was conducted
fairly.5" The court rejected Rose's argument and instead construed
Rose's contract with the Reds and its relation to the Major League
Agreement differently.
1. The Major League Agreement and the Rules Promulgated
Pursuant to It
The Major League Agreement authorizes the Commissioner to in-
vestigate any act, transaction or practice that is suspected "not [to be] in
the best interests of the national game of baseball." 9 In connection with
this power, the Commissioner is given virtually unlimited authority to
formulate his own rules of procedure for conducting the above men-
tioned duties.6' There are two limitations on the Commissioner's ex-
traordinary power. He must recognize the right of any party in interest
54. Id.
55. Various procedural rules govern the conduct of baseball players. Pursuant to the Ma-
jor League Agreement, the Commissioner is authorized to promulgate his own "Rules of Pro-
cedure." In addition, each professional baseball league has promulgated their own rules
known as the "Major League Rules."
56. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 916.
57. Rules of Procedure, § 3 (formulated by the Commissioner pursuant to the Major
League Agreement, Art. I § 2(e) (1975)).
58. Plaintiff's Complaint at 25, Rose, 721 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (No. C-2-89-
0577).
59. Major League Agreement, Art. I § 2(b) (1975).
60. Major League Agreement, Art. I § 2(e) (1975).
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to appear before him and to be heard, and he must recognize the right of
the American and National League presidents to be heard upon any mat-
ter affecting the interests of the two leagues.6'
In contrast to the Commissioner's own Rules of Procedure, the two
leagues that make up Major League Baseball have formally adopted their
own rules governing matters related to the sport in general. These rules
are known as the "Major League Rules" and have been accepted by the
twenty-six major league professional baseball clubs as binding upon
them.62
2. Rose's Employment Contract With The Reds
The court considered Rose's contract with the Reds in light of the
two separate Rules of Procedure promulgated pursuant to the Major
League Agreement. Rose's contract with the Cincinnati Reds provides
in relevant part: "The National League Constitution, Regulations and/
or Rules and the Major League and Professional Baseball Agreements and
Rules, and all amendments thereto hereafter adopted, are hereby made a
part of this contract.",
63
Judge Holschuh admitted that the Major League Agreement is in-
corporated in Rose's contract with the Reds. However, as between the
two procedural rules promulgated pursuant to this agreement, the court
concluded that only the "Major League Rules" were expressly incorpo-
rated into Rose's contract with the Cincinnati Reds.' Furthermore, the
court stated that only the "Major League Rules" were adopted by mem-
bers of Major League Baseball and that the Rules of Procedure, indepen-
dently promulgated by the Commissioner, were not.65 The court found
that there was nothing in the Major League Agreement, the Major
League Rules, or in Rose's contract with the Reds which gave the Reds
any right to prevent or interfere in any manner with a disciplinary hear-
ing conducted by the Commissioner.66
The court then focused on Rose's complaint, and found that Rose
had not alleged that the Cincinnati Reds were presently in breach of con-
tract, nor had he alleged that the Reds had taken any action which would
indicate an anticipatory breach.67 Therefore, the court concluded that
61. Id.
62. Major League Rules, Rule 50.
63. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 916 (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 917.
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although the Reds had an interest in the present action, for the purposes
of determining diversity jurisdiction, the Reds were fraudulently joined,
and at best, only a nominal party in the action.68
In light of its analysis, the court concluded that the only defendant
whose citizenship was relevant to its removability determination was
Commissioner Giamatti.69 Major League Baseball and the Cincinnati
Reds were fraudulently joined and thus their citizenship could be ignored
in determining whether the case was removable based on diversity
jurisdiction.7"
Despite this conclusion, in dicta, Judge Holschuh refuted Rose's re-
maining arguments.71 Rose alleged that all the defendants owed him the
contractual duty to ensure that the Commissioner adhered to the Major
League Agreement and discharged his duties in accordance with the
Rules of Procedure. The court refused to recognize any contractual duty
to prevent the Commissioner from conducting hearings "deemed by the
Commissioner not to be in the best interests of baseball."72 Further, the
court stated that the Commissioner's own Rules of Procedure were not
even a part of the Major League Agreement. Thus, even if the Commis-
sioner violated the rules, an action against the Commissioner may arise,
but no liability would be imposed upon the Reds or any other members
of Major League Baseball.73
The court also refuted Rose's agency argument. Rose contended
that the Commissioner, in conducting disciplinary proceedings, was act-
ing as an agent for Major League Baseball. Therefore, Major League
Baseball was liable for any violation of the Commissioner's duty to Rose
to follow his own procedural rules.74 The court admitted that Rose's
agency argument might have merit if Major League Baseball were a typi-
cal unincorporated association. However, the court noted that with re-
gard to disciplinary matters, the Clubs had vested such power in the
Commissioner making him totally independent from their control. Since
the Clubs have no control over the Commissioner, the court concluded
that neither Major League Baseball nor its constituent clubs could be
held liable if the Commissioner failed to act in accordance with his Rules
of Procedure.75
68. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 917.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 919.
72. Id.
73. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 919.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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Rose relied on Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co. 76 ("Bank of
Kentucky"), to support his position that although Major League Base-
ball has no control over the Commissioner in disciplinary matters, it
should nevertheless be held liable for his conduct." In Bank of Ken-
tucky, an express mail company used the services of a railroad company
to transport money to and from various banks. When a shipment of
money was lost due to the collapse of a railroad trestle, the express com-
pany sought to avoid liability to its customer on the ground that it had
no control over the railroad company or its employees. The United
States Supreme Court held that the express company could not avoid
liability by alleging lack of control over the railroad. Instead, the Court
held that the nature of the express company's business lent itself to being
a common carrier, and as such the express company was liable despite
lack of control. The district court in Rose distinguished Bank of Ken-
tucky as applying only to common carriers.7"
The court also refuted Rose's argument in support of a claim against
Major League Baseball and the Reds. Rose contended that because the
members of Major League Baseball must act if any action is to be taken
against Rose, those members who are injuring Rose must be proper par-
ties, and thus their citizenship cannot be ignored for diversity purposes.7 9
The court found the argument speculative because it depended on the
Commissioner actually conducting a hearing, finding that Rose had vio-
lated the Major League Rules concerning wagering on baseball games,
and placed him on the ineligible list before any obligation to take action
would arise on the part of Major League Baseball and its constituent
clubs." In finding that the Clubs occupied a neutral role in the dispute
between Rose and the Commissioner, the court concluded that they had
no legal interest in the controversy, and were merely nominal parties for
the purpose of determining diversity of citizenship."' Therefore, the only
proper party whose citizenship was of consequence in determining
whether diversity existed, was defendant Commissioner Giamatti.
Rose's employer, the Cincinnati Reds, and the association that governs
76. 93 U.S. 174 (1876).
77. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 919.
78. Id. at 919-20.
79. Id.
80. Major League Rule 15(c) provides in relevant part:
(1) A PLAYER OR OTHER PERSON found guilty of misconduct or other acts
mentioned in Professional Baseball Rule 21, or convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, may be placed on the 'Ineligible List' by the Commissioner .... A player
or other person on the Ineligible List shall not be eligible to play or associate with
any Major League or National Association Club until reinstated.
81. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 921.
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all the professional baseball clubs, Major League Baseball, were improper
parties whose citizenship could be ignored for the purposes of determin-
ing diversity.
V. THE COURT ERRED IN TAKING AWAY ROSE'S HOME-FIELD
The district court concluded that Major League Baseball could be
disregarded as a party for determining diversity jurisdiction because,
"[c]learly, complete relief can be afforded with regard to the primary
relief sought in the complaint - preventing Commissioner Giamatti
from conducting a disciplinary hearing - without the need for any order
against Major League Baseball or its constituent clubs."82 This conclu-
sion is wrong for two reasons. First, the court applied the wrong stan-
dard to evaluate whether Major League Baseball's citizenship may be
disregarded. Second, the court misperceived the nature of the primary
relief sought by Rose.
A. The District Court Exceeded the Scope of Inquiry Authorized by
Law for Determining Its Jurisdiction
The proper standard for determining whether a defendant is fraudu-
lently joined requires the removing party to show: (1) that there is no
possibility that the plaintiff could establish a cause of action against the
non-diverse defendant in state court; or (2) that there has been outright
fraud in the plaintiff's pleadings of jurisdictional facts.8 3 Courts have
generally applied this standard to deny removal or grant plaintiff's mo-
tion to remand by finding that the non-removing party (plaintiff) would
be able to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in
state court.
8 4
Long ago the Sixth Circuit announced that when examining a mo-
tion to remand, "[a]ll doubt should be resolved in favor of remand."8' 5
This rule has been followed throughout the federal judicial system8 6
82. Id. at 919.
83. B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (emphasis in
original).
84. See Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1968) ("[I]n testing fraudulent joinder it is enough to show a good faith expectation, not a legal
certainty, that the attacked claim is good under state law."); Breymann v. Pennsylvania, Ohio
& Detroit Railroad Co., 38 F.2d 209, 212 (6th Cir. 1930) ("It is sufficient that a bona fide claim
of joint liability, presenting a justiciable question of substance, was made by the petition and it
necessarily follows that the court erred in denying the motion to remand.").
85. Breymann v. Pennsylvania, Ohio & Detroit Railroad Co., 38 F.2d 209, 212 (6th Cir.
1930). See also Hopkins Erecting Co. v. Briarwood Apartments, 517 F. Supp. 243, 252 (E.D.
Ky. 1981).
86. See Ables v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985); Fajen v.
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When removal is challenged by a motion to remand, the burden is on the
removing party to prove his right to a federal forum.8 7 When a defend-
ant seeks access to federal court by asserting fraudulent joinder of a non-
diverse party, as did Commissioner Giamatti, that burden is a heavy one
because it is asking the court to ignore a properly joined and served
defendant.8
In its analysis of diversity jurisdiction, the district court looked at -
each defendant and asked whether it was fraudulently joined. If the
court found that a particular defendant was fraudulently joined, the
court ignored its citizenship for the purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction. This analysis is flawed because it ignored the proper stan-
dard for determining whether a defendant is actually fraudulently joined.
The test is not, as the district court applied it, whether the federal
court can identify a diverse party against whom an order can be entered
providing complete relief. The district court's erroneous analysis dra-
matically expands the class of cases arising under state law which are
removable. Under the district court's analysis, removal is proper at any
stage in the litigation where the court can identify a diverse party as the
only party against whom an order might afford complete relief. This
finding can be made regardless of whether relief ultimately may be
granted against the non-diverse parties. Instead of applying the proper
standard, the district court resolved all doubts in favor of retaining juris-
diction and rejected Rose's claims that there was, at least, a possibility
that a state court could find that a cause of action existed.
It is true that a district court faced with allegations of fraudulent
joinder may pierce the pleadings. When a court pierces the pleadings, it
determines whether under any set of facts alleged in the petition, a claim
against the defendants could be asserted under state law. 9 This does not
mean that a federal court will pre-try, as a matter of course, doubtful
issues of fact to determine removability.9" As will be shown, there are
numerous instances where the district court erroneously pre-tried the
merits of Rose's claims against the Reds and Major League Baseball in
order to disregard their citizenship and retain jurisdiction.
Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing
Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549, 551 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
87. R. G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1979).
88. Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1039 (1984).
89. Keating v. Shell Chemical Co., 610 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1980).
90. Dodd v. Fawcett Publications Inc., 329 F.2d 82, 85 (10th Cir. 1964) (reviewing denial
of remand on interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
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1. Rose's Possible Claims Against Major League Baseball
Had the district court applied the proper test, it could not have dis-
regarded Major League Baseball's citizenship. The court recognized that
Major League Baseball and its member clubs will ultimately act to Rose's
detriment if the Commissioner imposes sanctions.9 Therefore, the court
should also have recognized that a possible claim against Major League
Baseball existed. However, the district court overlooked the fact that
Rose's complaint alleged that sanctions will be imposed given the Com-
missioner's prejudgment.92 Thus, the court erred in judging the remova-
bility of Rose's case solely on what it perceived Rose's claim for relief to
be and not on what the complaint actually alleged; an inevitable chain of
events involving all defendants.
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Rules of Procedure
promulgated by the Commissioner do not exist separate and apart from
the Major League Agreement, but rather spring from it. The member
clubs agreed in article I, section 2(e) of the Major League Agreement
that it shall be the function of the Commissioner to formulate "the rules
of procedure to be observed by the Commissioner" and agreed on the
minimum procedural protection which those Rules must contain.93 The
leagues and clubs comprising Major League Baseball also agreed, in arti-
cle VII, section 3 of the Major League Agreement, that the contracts
with their employees would contain clauses by which the parties to those
contracts agreed to accept the Commissioner's decisions "rendered in ac-
cordance with this Agreement."94
Reading both provisions of the Major League Agreement together,
it appears that the member leagues and clubs of Major League Baseball
agreed to delegate some of their disciplinary authority over employees to
the Commissioner. However, it is also a reasonable construction of the
Agreement that the leagues and clubs intended to give their employees
the benefit of some procedural protection when subject to that discipli-
nary authority. Namely the leagues and clubs would ensure that the
Commissioner's actions comport with principles of due process. Thus,
an Ohio court could conclude that Rose, or any other club employee, is a
third-party beneficiary of the Major League Agreement. Therefore, Rose
had a possible cause of action against Major League Baseball and its con-
stituent members. Rose's cause of action would be as alleged in his com-
plaint, that in the event Rose was denied his procedural protection,
91. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 920.
92. Id.
93. Major League Agreement, Art. I § 2(e) (1975).
94. Major League Agreement, Art. VII § 3.
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Major League Baseball would be liable to him because it agreed to pro-
vide those protections as a check on the Commissioner's disciplinary
power.95
Even if the Rules of Procedure are not part of the Major League
Agreement, the Agreement itself gives Rose rights to an unbiased com-
missioner. The Major League Agreement specifically guarantees the
"right of any party in interest to ... be heard."96 An opportunity to be
heard has been construed by courts to mean that a right to be heard must
be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 97 Thus,
Rose's allegation that Commissioner Giamatti pre-judged Rose's guilt of
betting on baseball alleges a direct breach of the Major League Agree-
ment because any hearing before Commissioner Giamatti would not be
meaningful.
2. Rose's Possible Claims Against the Cincinnati Reds
The district court erroneously concluded that the Rules of Proce-
dure do not form a part of Rose's employment contract with the Cincin-
nati Reds. Rose's contract with the Reds states that "the Major League
. . . Agreements and Rules, and all amendments thereto hereinafter
adopted, are hereby made a part of this contract."9' The district court
admitted that based on the above language, the Major League Agreement
was incorporated into Rose's contract with the Reds.99 Moreover, the
court admitted that two separate rules of procedure were developed pur-
suant to this Agreement.'0 Namely, the Rules of Procedure promul-
gated by the Commissioner and the Major League Rules promulgated by
the individual clubs. However, the court concluded that only the Major
League Rules were specifically incorporated into Rose's contract with
the Reds and not the Commissioner's procedural rules.' This interpre-
tation enabled the court to hold that Rose did not have a cause of action
against the Reds for breach of contract. 02
This construction of Rose's contract is fatally flawed. To find that
95. See Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Railroad Co.,
351 F.2d 121, 126 (6th Cir. 1965) ("Ohio recognizes the general right of a third-party benefici-
ary to sue on a contract intended for his benefit.").
96. Major League Agreement, Art. I § 2(e) (1975).
97. Professional Sports Ltd. v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 373 F. Supp. 946, 951
(W.D. Tex. 1974) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
98. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 916.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 917.
1990]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
the entire Major League Agreement is expressly incorporated into Rose's
contract with the Reds, and then find that only one set of procedural
rules promulgated pursuant to that entire agreement, actually became
part of Rose's contract with the Reds is illogical. Since the entire Agree-
ment is expressly incorporated into Rose's contract with the Reds, it is
inherently more reasonable to find that all procedural rules that were
promulgated pursuant to that agreement are also incorporated into
Rose's contract. Under this more logical construction, a state court
could find that a breach of the Rules of Procedure by the Commissioner
is, by virtue of the incorporation of the Major League Agreement into
Rose's employment contract with the Reds, a breach of that contract as
well.
B. This Decision Does Not Reflect Sound Policy
The district court erred in concluding that Commissioner Giamatti
is not an agent of Major League Baseball simply because the Major
League Agreement confers broad powers on the Commissioner. Indeed
the court recognized that Rose's claims against Major League Baseball
arising out of the acts of its chief executive officer, the Commissioner,
might have merit if it were a "typical business organization."' 03 How-
ever, it declined to apply established principles of law and relied on an
overly indulgent reading of prior baseball cases."° For at least four rea-
sons, the district court's infatuation with the supposed uniqueness of the
Baseball Commissioner's relationship is wrong. First, the district court
relied on Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn in construing the Commis-
sioner's broad powers. 0 5 However, since 1978, when Finley was de-
cided, the Major League Agreement has been amended several times.
For example, the Agreement was amended in 1984, at the then-Commis-
sioner's request, to provide that the Commissioner would henceforth be
the "chief executive officer" of Major League Baseball. 0 6 Also, a 1983
preamble to a resolution amending article V, section 2 of the Major
League Agreement, stated that Major League Baseball is a unique associ-
103. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 919.
104. The theory that Baseball, or any other litigant, has a unique exemption from laws of
general applicability has never been recognized in the United States courts. See Kansas City
Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 409 F. Supp. 233, 270 (W.D.
Mo. 1976), aff'd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[I1f called upon to make a finding in regard to
what would serve the public interest, we would find that.., the baseball industry be treated no
differently from any other interstate industry.").
105. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding Commissioner's authority to disapprove at-
tempted assignments of three players by professional baseball club on ground that assignments
would be potentially harmful to baseball), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
106. Major League Agreement, Art. I § 2(a) (1975) (amended 1984).
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ation of clubs and leagues organized to do business interdependently. 107
Furthermore, Baseball's "uniqueness" for federal antitrust law pur-
poses - recognized in Finley - hardly amounts to a blanket exemption
from all federal laws, including settled principles of diversity jurisdiction
and state private association and contract law principles. Indeed, in Sa-
lerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs 108 ("Salerno"),
the court dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction because the
American League, an unincorporated association, was through one of its
members, a resident of the same state as one of the plaintiffs.
Moreover, the Finley court recognized that the Commissioner and
defendant leagues' actions were subject to the requirements imposed on
ordinary private associations by state law. IoI Concurring members of the
Finley court also specifically found that the Commissioner's decisions
could be overturned if the Commissioner "was biased or motivated by
malice." ' '
In any event, Finley did not involve federal jurisdiction issues, but
rather challenged the authority of the Commissioner to disapprove
player assignments.' In fact, both the American and National Leagues
were party defendants with the Commissioner in that case."1 2 The only
case which addressed the citizenship of an unincorporated association of
professional baseball for diversity purposes was Salerno. That case was
dismissed due to the presence of the non-diverse association.'
1 3
C. The District Court Misunderstood the Primary Relief Sought by
Rose
The district court erroneously concluded that the primary relief
sought by Rose was to stop Commissioner Giamatti from conducting a
107. Major League Agreement, Preamble to Art. V § 2 (1975) (amended 1983). "Major
League Baseball is a unique association of twenty-six teams, operating both as individual
franchises organized into two leagues, and doing business collectively as Major League Base-
ball." Id.
108. 310 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1001 (1971). In Salerno, umpires of the American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs brought suit against the American League, an unincorporated association, the president
of the American League as representative of the association, and the Commissioner of Base-
ball. The umpire-plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated antitrust laws by boycotting
plaintiffs from employment as umpires. The court dismissed for lack of subject matter juris-
diction because properly joined defendant, American League, was non-diverse from umpire-
plaintiffs. Id. at 731.
109. Finley, 569 F.2d at 544 & n.65.
110. Id. at 546 (Fairchild, Chief Judge, concurring).
111. Id. at 532.
112. Id. at 531.
113. Salerno, 310 F. Supp. at 731. See also supra note 101.
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disciplinary hearing." 4 That was only one aspect of the relief Rose
sought. The primary relief Rose sought was an order preventing all de-
fendants from barring him from participating in Major League Baseball.
Such a bar would be based on disciplinary proceedings which Rose al-
leged to be unfair, in violation of Ohio law, the Major League Agreement
and his contract with the Reds." 5 The ultimate harm Rose sought to
prevent was exclusion from baseball. The exclusion would have been un-
dertaken by the leagues and clubs belonging to Major League Baseball
once the Commissioner rendered his decision.
The district court focused only on the harm that would be caused by
the Commissioner's hearing. "6 However, holding a hearing was only
part of the chain of events which would have caused Rose harm. This
chain of events required the active participation of Major League Base-
ball to implement any decision the Commissioner reached. Thus, the
district court should have concluded that the citizenship of both Major
League Baseball and the Reds could not be ignored for the purposes of
determining diversity jurisdiction.
This decision does not reflect sound policies of state sovereignty and
diversity jurisdiction and does not move toward desired goals. When
federal removal jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship, the
exercise of that jurisdiction ousts the state courts from acting in cases
which are properly within their jurisdiction. Thus, the dictates of feder-
alism require that removal jurisdiction be exercised, to the exclusion of
the state courts, only when such jurisdiction is clearly present. 7 More-
over, although the district court apparently believed otherwise, the fed-
eral courts no longer need to assert diversity jurisdiction for the sole
purpose of protecting litigants from becoming the victims of provincial
prejudice in state courts." 8
114. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 915.
115. Plaintiff's Complaint at 25, Rose, 721 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (No. C-2-89-
0577).
116. Rose, 721 F. Supp. at 919. See also supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
117. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) ("Due regard for the
rightful independence of state governments which should actuate federal courts, requires that
they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has
defined.").
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1441, Revision Notes to § 1441 provide that:
All the provisions with reference to removal of controversies between citizens of dif-
ferent States because of inability, from prejudice or local influence, to obtain justice,
have been discarded. These provisions, born of the bitter sectional feelings engen-
dered by the Civil War and the Reconstruction period, have no place in the jurispru-
dence of a nations since united by three wars against foreign powers.
Id. (emphasis added).
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VI. CONCLUSION
When the district court decided that Major League Baseball and the
Reds were only nominal parties, the court created for employers and pri-
vate association members an absolute immunity from liability. This im-
munity is attainable merely by investing the chief executive officer,
Commissioner Giamatti," 9 with plenary power to act on their behalf.
The Rose court's decision means that whenever a baseball employee al-
leges that he has been treated unfairly only the chief executive officer is a
proper party to the case. This is to the exclusion of the association for
whom the chief executive officer acts, and to the exclusion of the player's
employer, a member of that association. Whether a member of a baseball
team can be afforded complete relief when he alleges that he has been
treated improperly in violation of procedural rights guaranteed him in
both the Major League Agreement and his employment contract is now
questionable.
This decision greatly expands the diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts at a time when there is a growing trend towards restricting the
number of federal cases based on diversity jurisdiction. 2 ' Furthermore,
the district court's engagement in judicial gymnastics to find that diver-
sity jurisdiction exists is inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit's hostility
toward this type of subject matter jurisdiction. 2' Instead of turning es-
tablished principles of sports, employment, and unincorporated associa-
tion law on their heads, the district court should have held that both
parties to Rose's employment contract, the Reds and Major League
Baseball, were proper parties to the action. Thus, the citizenship of these
two parties should not have been ignored and the action should have
been remanded to Rose's home field - the Ohio state court.
Kimberly G. Winer
119. Commissioner Giamatti suffered a heart attack on September 1, 1989 and passed away.
The new Commissioner of Major League Baseball, Fay Vincent, served as Giamatti's Deputy
Commissioner prior to Giamatti's sudden death.
120. See infra note 109.
121. The Sixth Circuit's position on diversity jurisdiction has been expressed in Arrow-
Hart, Inc. v. Philip Carey Co., 552 F.2d 711, 713 (6th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he diversity jurisdiction
of federal courts is an anachronism and should be repealed.").
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